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DRAFT

RE-THINKING MINNESOTA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE
TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE USING A PREVENTION LENS
Caroline Palmer and Bradley Prowant*
“A key problem with Minnesota’s policy is that we have not asked the right questions. We’ve
asked, ‘How can we lock up the most dangerous?’ We should be asking, ‘How can we prevent
the most violence?’ We should be intensely studying the issue and allocating scarce resources to
a mix of programs and approaches whose prevention efficacy has empirical support.”1
I.

Introduction
Sexual violence is one of the most difficult issues we face in the human condition.

Anyone can be a victim – the harm knows no demographic boundaries. In Minnesota it was
estimated that in one year 61,000 residents were subjected to a sexual assault.2 This number
could nearly fill the Metrodome in downtown Minneapolis. And survivors face many personal
challenges. Rape is among “the most severe of all traumas, causing multiple, long-term negative
outcomes.”3 Even with the many strides that have occurred in recent years to support a victimcentered response, survivors who seek help from the legal, medical and mental health systems,
among others still “may face disbelief, blame, and refusals of help instead of assistance.” 4 It is a
problem that demands a response from all levels of society. And yet this response is lacking.
But the inadequacy of the sexual violence response does not lie solely within our systems
or the victim-blaming myths perpetuated by society and reflected in jury pools. Public policy, the
driving force behind the system response, has failed to see the big picture when it comes to the
* Caroline Palmer, J.D. is Staff Attorney at the Minnesota Coalition Against Sexual Assault (MNCASA). She is a
graduate of Hamline University School of Law and Barnard College. She was a Policy Fellow at the Hubert H.
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota. Bradley Prowant is a third-year student at the
University of Minnesota Law School. He received his B.A. in history and philosophy from the University of Iowa.
1
Eric Janus, Examining Our Approaches to Sex Offenders & The Law: Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment
Program: Would an Empirically-Based Prevention Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1083,
1085 (2003) (hereinafter referred to as Examining Our Approaches).
2
Minn. Dep’t of Health, Costs of Sexual Violence in Minnesota 4 (July 2007),
http://www.pire.org/documents/mn_brochure.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (hereinafter Costs Report). The study
contains statistics for the year 2005.
3
Rebecca Campbell, Emily Dworkin and Giannina Cabral, An Ecological Model of the Impact of Sexual Assault on
Women’s Mental Health, 10 TRAUMA VIOLENCE ABUSE 225 (2009).
4
Id. at 226.
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relationship between effective law making and sexual violence prevention and intervention.
According to Joan Tabachnick and Alisa Klein, authors of A Reasoned Approach: Reshaping Sex
Offender Policy to Prevent Child Sexual Abuse, “Experts agree that a criminal justice response
alone cannot prevent sexual abuse or keep communities safe. Yet tougher sentencing and
increased monitoring of sex offenders are fully funded in many states, while victim services and
prevention programs are woefully underfunded.”5 An effective policy geared towards ending
sexual violence and holding offenders accountable must be comprehensive in its approach,
constructed with the view of preventing sexual violence from occurring in the first place,
aggressively intervening when it does and looking to the future to stop further harm.
But current public policy is decidedly lopsided in its response, so focused on punishment,
particularly for the worst-of-the-worst offenders, that there is little opportunity for ideas about
prevention, let alone meaningful support for victims or far-reaching rehabilitation programs for
offenders, to gain the serious traction in the discussion. This state of affairs is driven, in part, by
the complexity of the issues, and no one would argue that they are not among the most difficult
and politically unpopular any lawmaker has to face. Considerable public safety and public health
concerns are at stake.
Still, horrific headlines about sex crimes often translate into near instant legislative
solutions, without regard to the fact that there may not be a one-size-fits-all answer or that there
may be a negative unintended consequence in some other part of the legal response or that sexual
violence requires a comprehensive and well-considered strategic approach.6 According to the
5

Joan Tabachnick and Alisa Klein, Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, A Reasoned Approach:
Reshaping
Sex
Offender
Policy
to
Prevent
Child
Sexual
Abuse
2
(2011),
http://www.atsa.com/pdfs/ppReasonedApproach.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (hereinafter referred to as A
Reasoned Approach).
6
Id. at 21-24. According to Tabachnick and Klein:
There is a growing understanding that the simple solutions offered by legislative policies broadly
applied to every offender have not been effective in keeping children safe or preventing child
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Council of State Governments, “Some state leaders have expressed concern that the urgency of
efforts to strengthen sex offender management policy is prohibiting lawmakers from fully
considering the range of long-term impacts such policies will have.”7 Little time is spent
reviewing the evidence or collecting expert opinion when the public pressure is on to punish sex
offenders. Prevention-related proposals are sometimes met with skepticism in this retributive
environment because it is difficult to prove that a sexual violence crime did not occur and that its
unaccountability has a causal link to a specific policy.8 As the National Alliance to End Sexual
Violence (NAESV), a victim-centered organization committed to educating federal policy
makers about best practices in the sexual violence response, wrote in a 2008 position statement:
States and communities across the nation are developing measures to
manage adult sex offenders with the express purpose of increasing safety
for victims and communities. Unfortunately, not all measures currently
being enacted do, in fact, increase safety. Some put communities at higher
risk, while others create a false sense of security.9
One good example of misdirected public policy is residency restrictions, which according to
some studies (including one by the Minnesota Department of Corrections) show little success in
preventing re-offenses or providing a reliable protective strategy for public safety.10 And yet this
blanket solution still holds currency among many policy makers.11

abuse. Furthermore, the isolating and stigmatizing effect of legislation on sex offenders and their
families have generated a number of unintended consequences that limit family, community and
societal ability to prevent sexual abuse in the first place. Tough restrictive policies are needed for
the most dangerous sex offenders in society. But these policies are applied broadly and typically
do not recognize the continuum of behaviors of sexual abuse, the range of ages of those who
sexually abuse, and the range of risks posed by sex offenders to re-offend.
Id. at 42.
7
See A Reasoned Approach, supra note 5 at 27, citing Council of State Governments, Sex Offender Management
Policy
in
the
States:
Strengthening
Policy
and
Practice
(2010),
http://www.csg.org/policy/SexOffenderManagementProject.aspx (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 27 citing National Alliance to End Sexual Violence, Community Management of Convicted Sex Offenders:
Registration, Electronic Monitoring, Civil Commitment, Mandatory Minimums and Residency Restrictions (2008).
See www.endsexualviolence.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
10
Id. at 24. See Minnesota Department of Corrections, Residential Proximity and Sex Offense Recidivism in
Minnesota 2 (April 2007) (re-offenses in study would have not been deterred by residential restrictions),
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Victim advocacy organizations such as NAESV and the Minnesota Coalition Against
Sexual Assault (MNCASA)12 have a strong interest in a robust public policy response to ending
sexual violence. But the response must make sense and take into account both prevention and
intervention strategies, backed up by research and expertise in the field. The authors of this
article contend that Minnesota policy makers are at a crossroads. They have an unprecedented
opportunity to make some important changes, ones that incorporate prevention and intervention
strategies. This opportunity comes out of necessity – not only because the harm persists but also
because the current system, particularly the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, is under close
scrutiny due to mounting costs and looming legal challenges.13
The key question we as a society confront is what changes will satisfactorily balance
justice for victims with offender accountability, attempts at rehabilitation through treatment, and
high community expectations about public safety? This article offers background on what the
discussion about prevention of sexual violence can look like,14 a theoretical analysis of the policy
conundrum facing our lawmakers15 and some examples of how prevention and intervention
strategies can be put into practice in Minnesota law as advanced through MNCASA’s legislative
agenda16 with the hope that a new direction can be charted toward the best possible public policy
response for the state.
II.

Sexual Violence Prevention: Redefining the Discussion

http://www.doc.state.mn.us/documents/04-07SexOffenderReport-Proximity.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2012). See also
Colorado Department of Public Safety, Division of Criminal Justice, Sex Offender Management Board, Report on
Safety Issues Raised by Living Arrangements for and Location of Sex Offenders (2004) (residency restrictions are
not deterrents to sex offense crimes), http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/sex_offender/SO_Pdfs/FullSLAFinal01.pdf (last
visited Oct. 7, 2012).
11
See e.g. Minn. Stat. §260B.198, subd. 1a (signed into law on May 24, 2011; creates residency restrictions for
some juvenile offenders).
12
See www.mncasa.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
13
See Section III.
14
See Section II.
15
See Section IV.
16
See Section V.
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Responsibility for the prevention of sexual violence is often placed on the individual and
most commonly manifests itself in the form of risk reduction techniques such as self defense
courses, safety tips, the buddy system and educational programs for children about good touch or
bad touch. While these tools do have value they can also create a false sense of security, a belief
that the individual alone can prevent sexual violence from occurring, a belief even that it is the
individual’s duty to do so.17 Even the most prepared and informed person can still be a victim of
sexual violence. There are only so many variables that can be controlled and ultimately it is the
perpetrator who decides to commit the crime. Still, society continues to subscribe to beliefs about
sexual assault that place blame on the victim.18 When prevention strategies focus only on the
victim’s perceived responsibilities without regard to the potential perpetrator’s criminal actions
they only serve to perpetuate the myths.
Sexual violence prevention strategies are modeled upon a public health approach.19 There
are three levels of prevention strategies that can be applied to the analysis: primary, secondary
and tertiary.20 Primary prevention takes action to prevent problems from occurring in the first
place. It involves a systematic process that promotes healthy behaviors and an environment that

17

There are also unintended consequences related to risk reduction strategies. For example, it may not be safe to
fight back during an attack, especially if the perpetrator has a weapon, is bigger than the victim, or employs some
sort of coercive or threatening tactic. Also, many risk reduction strategies are focused on stranger attacks when
statistics show that the victim knows the assailant in some way (family, friend, intimate partner, acquaintance,
fellow student or employee, etc.). Nonstranger perpetrators are able to use trust against a victim in ways that a
stranger cannot. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 64% of female victims and 40% of male victims knew
the
perpetrator.
NATIONAL
CRIME
VICTIMIZATION
SURVEY,
2010
9,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv10.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
18
See State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 293 (Minn. 2011). “The research provided by the State and amici shows that
the public holds and gives credence to rape myths.” Id. See also Kaarin Long, Caroline Palmer & Sara Thome, A
Distinction Without a Difference: Why the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Overrule its Precedent Precluding the
Admission of Helpful Expert Testimony in Adult-Victim Sexual Assault Cases, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y, 569,
582-91 (August 2010) (hereinafter A Distinction Without a Difference).
19
See Prevention Institute, http://www.preventioninstitute.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
20
Minnesota Department of Health, The Promise of Primary Prevention of Sexual Violence: A Five-Year Plan to
Prevent
Sexual
Violence
and
Exploitation
in
Minnesota,
5
(2009),
http://www.health.state.mn.us/injury/pub/svpplan.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (citations omitted).
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reduces the likelihood or frequency of occurrence. Secondary prevention is the immediate
response after an incident. It addresses short-term consequences and is most commonly
recognized as crisis intervention. Victim advocacy, responses from law enforcement and medical
providers, and community-based awareness campaigns describing an assault are examples of
secondary prevention responses. Tertiary prevention attempts to decrease the long-term disability
associated with the problem and looks to prevent possible reoccurrence of the problem.
Examples of tertiary prevention responses are extended support and treatment for sexual assault
survivors, sex offender treatment programs and reform of criminal sexual conduct statutes. The
justice system response is interwoven within the secondary and tertiary levels.21
Another common prevention analysis is The Spectrum of Prevention. Larry Cohen
developed this nationally recognized response model while he was director of the Contra Costa
Health Services Prevention Program in California.22 It can be applied to a variety of public health
concerns from violence prevention to nutrition, fitness, traffic safety and smoking cessation,
among many others.23
There are six levels for strategy development in the Spectrum that “are complementary
and when used together produce a synergy that results in greater effectiveness than would be
possible by implementing any single activity.”24 This multi-tiered approach creates roles for the
individual, the community and greater society: 1) strengthening individual knowledge and skills;
2) promoting community education; 3) educating providers; 4) fostering coalitions and networks;
5) changing organizational practices; and 6) influencing policy and legislation.25 What the

21

Id.
Id. at http://www.preventioninstitute.org/component/jlibrary/article/id-105/127.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
The Spectrum is based on the work of Dr. Marshall Swift in treating developmental disabilities.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
22
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Spectrum demonstrates is that the prevention response depends on a variety of partners,
organizing on both the grassroots and the formal systemic levels, to be successful. No one person
or organization or policymaker can do it alone. A variety strategies need to be deployed and
many different types of audiences (of all ages and developmental levels) should be targeted with
specially tailored messages. Participants on all the levels of the Spectrum are engaged and
innovating as the problem evolves over the passage of time.
Meaningful policy responses to sexual violence always consider the role of prevention.
The Governor’s Commission on Sex Offender Policy, convened by Minnesota Governor Tim
Pawlenty from 2004-05, for example, included in its recommendations the need for “increased
attention to the prevention of sex crimes.”26 The Commission’s members noted that:
While the potential long-term cost savings to the public health system
from preventing sex crimes are large – as is the potential to avoid
suffering by victims – specific strategies on how to break cycles of
offending are less clear. The Department of Health’s work on violence
prevention is a valuable start; and more should be done to develop,
research and discover effective prevention strategies.27
The Minnesota Department of Health later found that the cost of sexual violence to the state of
Minnesota could be estimated at $8 billion or $1,540 per resident in 2005.28 These are significant
numbers that have caught the attention of policy makers in the time since they were reported but
responsive action has been mostly limited to intervention efforts.29 To this date, no state dollars
have been invested in sexual violence prevention (current funding for the Minnesota Department
26

Governor’s
Commission
on Sex Offender
Policy
Final
Report,
6 (January 2005),
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/commissionsexoffenderpolicy/commissionfinalreport.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2012)
(hereinafter Governor’s Commission).
27
Id.
28
Costs Report, supra note 2 at 6. The cost estimate was 3.3 times the costs incurred by alcohol-impaired driving.
Id. The costs include medical care, mental health care, lost work, property damage, suffering and lost quality of life,
sexually transmitted infections, pregnancy, suicide acts, substance abuse, victim services/out of home placement,
investigation/adjudication, sanctioning/treatment, earning loss while confined, and primary prevention. Id. It is
believed that the $8 billion figure is actually low because several costs such as those borne by counties were not
included in the study.
29
See Section III.
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of Health’s in-house and contracting efforts in the area of prevention comes from federal sources
such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).30
It is time to shift the policy-making paradigm and prioritize prevention in an effective
manner.31 As Tabachnick and Klein stated in A Reasoned Approach, “The field of public health
calls for policies ‘that alter developmental trajectories leading to initial perpetration of violence’
as opposed to exclusive after-the-fact responses.”32 Prevention and intervention “are not
diametrically opposed constructs” – and as renewed attention is paid to improve the system
response to sexual violence in Minnesota (and particularly the management of the sex offenders
in the state’s expensive and controversial civil commitment program), there is also a renewed
opportunity to promote innovative solutions before the harm occurs.33
III.

Relevant History of System Response to Sexual Violence in Minnesota
It is helpful to review some of the legislative and other public policy response to sexual

violence in Minnesota before moving forward to analyze where improvements would benefit
from stronger integration of prevention and intervention responses. Many of these reforms
emerged in the 1970’s in an attempt to “craft a legal system that better reflects modern society’s

30

See funding note at bottom of Minn. Dep’t of Health Sexual Violence Prevention Program web page:
http://www.health.state.mn.us/injury/topic/svp/index.cfm (last visited November 25, 2012).
31
Caroline Palmer, Understanding the Relationship Between Prevention and Intervention Strategies to Stop Sexual
Violence, Violence Against Women Monitor (March 2010), http://www.stopvaw.org/the_vaw_monitor.html (last
visited Oct. 7, 2012) (hereinafter referred to as Understanding the Relationship).
32
A Reasoned Approach, supra note 5, at 27.
33
Understanding the Relationship, supra note 31. Note that the Minn. Dep’t of Human Services formed, under court
order, a Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force in October 2012. See Larry Oakes, Magnuson Leads
Task Force on Sex Offender Treatment (Oct. 7, 2012). http://www.startribune.com/local/173052971.html (last
visited Oct. 7, 2012).
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norms and expectations relating to sexual assault cases.”34 But even with these changes,
conviction rates remain the lowest for any serious felony.35
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412, one example of an early legal reform, bars evidence of
a victim’s past sexual conduct from being admitted at trial except in narrow circumstances.36
Commonly referred to as the “rape-shield law,” Rule 412 has its foundation in Minnesota Statute
609.347. Despite trial protections of a sexual assault victim’s character and past sexual activities
being a more contemporary issue,37 the rape-shield became law in 1975 amid sweeping reform to
Minnesota’s treatment of sex crimes. Buried beneath criticism of a slow moving legislature and
debates about gas taxes and handgun control, the reform received little attention.38 Nonetheless,
the statutes enacted on the last day of its 69th session the Minnesota Legislature are the basis for
current sex crimes within the Minnesota Criminal Code.39
The reform diversified the nature of criminal sexual conduct and abandoned more
primitive notions of offender accountability, improving understanding about the limits of consent
and who holds the power of consent. Prior to 1975, the Criminal Code division labeled “sex
crimes” contained 11 sections that failed to create culpability for most sexual violence. For
example, sections 609.291 and 609.292, titled “aggravated rape” and “rape” respectively, only
accounted for forced sexual intercourse by a man against a women who is not the man’s wife.40
Section 609.296, “indecent liberties,” also created a spousal exception. Furthermore, unless the
34

A Distinction Without a Difference, supra note 18, at 574, citing Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to
Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 Akron L. Rev. 957, 961 (2008).
35
Id. at 575 citing David Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Criminal Law: Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 1194, 1210 (1997). See also Jane Kim, Taking Rape Seriously: Rape as Slavery, 35 Harv. J. L. &
Gender 263, 264 fn. 8 (2012).
36
“Probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by inflammatory or prejudicial nature of
conduct” and either “the defense is raising consent of victim as a defense” or “the prosecution is using evidence of
semen, pregnancy, or disease.”
37
See Obeta, 796 N.W.2d at 282.
38
Legislators, Legislature get poor marks, Minneapolis Tribune, August 31, 1975, at 1A and 10A.
39
All references herein to “Criminal Code” shall mean the Minnesota Criminal Code unless stated otherwise.
40
Minn. Stat. §§ 609.291-92 (1974, repealed 1975).
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sexual violence involved a child, these were the only mechanisms by which a person could be
held liable for sexual assault.
In 1975, the Legislature repealed the “aggravated rape,” “rape,” and “indecent liberties”
statutes; the replacements are present-day statute sections 609.341-609.3451 which have had
some changes since 1975, but not any sort of wholesale overhaul. These statutes use the phrase
“criminal sexual conduct” (a phrase absent from the Criminal Code prior to 1975) to represent
varying degrees of sexual violence. By eliminating outdated notions of sexual violence, such as
the spousal exception, and broadening the conduct constituting an offense, the Legislature began
to recognize the complexity of sexual violence. Since 1975, that recognition has grown as
cognizance of sexual violence becomes greater. Offenses such as solicitation of minors for
sexual acts (enacted 1986), and non-consensual contact with a sexual intent (fifth degree criminal
sexual conduct, enacted 1988) and sex trafficking (§§609.281-284, all enacted 2005; §§609.321322, both enacted 1979 with updates in 2010) are examples of the Legislature’s attempts to cast a
wider net on the problem of sexual violence.
However, as the culpability net has widened, the legislative considerations for victims
have failed to keep pace. In addition to the rape-shield law, the 69th legislature passed section
609.35 which codified a county’s obligation to pay for medical expenses related to examining a
sexual assault victim. These two sections symbolize a rarity in the politics surrounding sexual
violence: victim-focused policy. Today, 32 statutes compose the “sex crimes” division of
Chapter 609. Of those 32, only three (one addition since 1975) are aimed at victims (enacted in
1984, section 609.3471 keeps information pertaining to a minor sexual assault victim
confidential).
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Notably, Minnesota Statutes Chapter 611A is intended to aid victims of crime generally.
Chapter 611A contains sections that allow for the creation of sexual violence victim services but
without appropriate and consistent funding, the efficacy of these sections fails. Punishment, not
restitution, has become the rule for sexual violence policy. The offender-focus of the legislature
has become perhaps most vivid in the last two decades with the evolution in application of
Minnesota’s Sex Offender laws.
a.

Minnesota Sex Offender Program

When determining whether to commit a sex offender, the state initially relied upon a
1939 law that allows for the civil commitment of individuals with sexual psychopathic
personalities.41 Immediately challenged (in 1939) on constitutional grounds, the Minnesota
Supreme Court established the standard to determine if one is apt for civil commitment: “an utter
lack of power to control [one’s] sexual impulses.”42 The law remained almost dormant until
high-profile sexual assaults in the 1980s led to its revival.43 Yet, as of 1990, no more than 30
individuals were in the state’s civil commitment program.44 Since 1990, there have been two
important changes to the commitment process – one procedural, one substantive. Both of these
changes were exacerbated by two high-profile events involving a sex offender.
Prior to 1991, county attorneys were charged with identifying possible candidates for the
civil commitment program. If the county attorney deemed an individual to meet the “lack of
power to control” standard, the county attorney could file a petition for a hearing. At that
hearing, a judge (never a jury) would hear the case for civil commitment and the State would be

41

See Minn. Stat. §253B.02 (2011).
ERIC JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE
STATE 29 (2006).
43
OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN., EVALUATION REPORT: CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX
OFFENDERS 4 (March 2011).
44
Id. at 4.
42
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charged with meeting a burden of “clear and convincing evidence.” A would-be commitment had
a right to appeal a judicial decision to commit. In 1991, the Department of Corrections began
referring possible civil commitment candidates to the country attorneys; thus reducing the
“legwork” county attorneys had to perform and easing their ability to commit an offender. The
referral procedure coupled with the pre-1991 procedure is the current procedure for civilly
committing sex offenders.
In 1992, the State recommended Dennis Darol Linehan for the civil commitment
program. After spending nearly thirty years in jail for a rape/murder, the State argued Linehan
still had an utter lack of control of his sexual impulses.45 A trial court and the Minnesota Court
of Appeals agreed. However, in 1994 the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the commitment
holding Linehan did not meet the high threshold of “utter lack to control.”46 Despite Linehan’s
somewhat advanced age (53 in 1994) and the fact that his release would be supervised, media
and public outcry caused the Legislature to act.47 In a special session convened in the aftermath
of Linehan’s non-commitment, the Legislature passed the current standard for commitment of
sex offenders.48

A person with “sexual psychopathic behavior” still qualifies for civil

commitment, but a lower threshold of “sexually dangerous person”49 also qualifies an individual
for commitment. The latter standard has three elements: 1) past harmful sexual conduct, 2)
sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction, and 3) recidivist risk.
In the face of the substantive change to civil commitment jurisprudence, in 2000 the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program had grown to 149 individuals (a large increase from 1990, but
low compared with the current population).

In 2003 the number of commitments rose

45

JANUS, supra note 42, at 29, 30.
Id. at 30.
47
Id. at 31, 32.
48
Id. at 31, 32.
49
See Minn. Stat. §253B.02 (2011).
46
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dramatically in response to outrage over the tragic rape/murder of college student Dru Sjodin by
a recently released, not-committed sex offender. Pressured by the Governor, the Department of
Corrections began referring large numbers of convicted sex offenders to county attorneys in
hopes that another sex offender would not “slip through.” In the five years following the tragic
events surrounding Sjodin, the Department of Corrections referred 157 sex offenders per year to
county attorneys; in the previous 12 years the Department of Corrections had referred a total of
333 sex offenders for civil commitment. The procedural and substantive changes implemented
by 2003 resulted in two-thirds of current “clients” of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program being
committed between 2004 and 2012.
In 2010, the Legislative Auditor evaluated the sex offender program and returned
unsettling results. Each commitment costs the state of Minnesota approximately $120,000 per
year, almost three times as much as an inmate in Minnesota’s prisons.50 The program is predicted
to grow at a rate slightly under 10% for the next ten years (or approximately 53 new
commitments each year) totaling in 1109 commitments in 2020.51 Thus far, the predicted growth
rate has proved accurate as the sex offender program had 653 clients as of June 19, 201252 The
underlying sexually violent offenses that each offender committed should not be minimized,
however such growth is unsustainable.
Given that the Legislative Audit Committee is comprised of both Democrats and
Republicans from both legislative bodies, lawmakers are cognizant of the unsustainability of
such growth.

With that awareness, seeking alternative means by which to combat sexual

violence seems to be the next logical step. However, current policy still fails to account for
50

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 43, at 1.
Id. at 4.
52
Minnesota
Sex
Offender
Program
Overview,
MINN.
DEP’T
OF
HUMAN
SERVS.,
http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService=GET_DYNAMIC_CONVERSION&dDocName=dhs16_14991
4&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
51
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prevention-focused policy as a legitimate method for curbing sexual violence and a wise outlet
for State funds that can complement ongoing intervention-based responses.
b.

Practical Concerns

All commitments to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program are considered “clients”
receiving treatment for their disorders, and all have been committed following prison sentences
for sexual violence.53 Theoretically, they cannot be prisoners (and must be clients) or it would
result in constitutional violations regarding double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. The United
States Supreme Court dismissed these concerns by finding that civil commitment following a
prison term is not punitive in nature.54 However, in 1982 the Court ruled that a person civilly
committed for a mental disorder must be receiving adequate treatment or such commitment
violates 14th Amendment due process.55 Some courts have applied this condition to the civil
commitment of sex offenders and a failure to provide appropriate treatment has resulted in
injunctive relief.56 Within these cases lurks an alarming possibility: civil commitment may be a
veneer for preventative detainment. Such concerns are beginning to arise in Minnesota because
of the large number of offenders being committed and the low number being released (only one
thus far). The most recent manifestation of these concerns is the certified class action by clients
of the sex offender program against the Minnesota Department of Human Services.57
Another concern is the high number of individuals Minnesota commits. Of the 20 states
that operate sex offender civil commitment programs, Minnesota commits the most per capita
and third most in gross commitments behind Florida and California. 58

53

Id.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
55
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-323 (1982).
56
Turay v. Seling, 108 F.Supp.2d 114 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
57
Karsjens v. Jesson, WL 3024440 (D. Minn. 2012).
58
LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 43, at 16-18.
54
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Minnesota’s sex offender program remains there at a cost of approximately $120,000 per year.59
The sex offender program operates at a budget of approximately $70 million annually.60 Absent
a decrease in commitments and/or large-scale releases, the money needed to operate the sex
offender program will continue to rise at alarming rates. And yet while the legislature continues
to fund the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, it allocates zero dollars for the prevention of
sexual violence. Furthermore, taking the legislature’s approach to sexual violence as a whole, it
spends more money on sexual offenders than it does on victims of sexual offenses.61
IV.

Analysis of Current Policy Response: The Problem of Induction
The history of the policy response to sex offender management is defined by fear and

reactionary politics. This is understandable; sexual violence is an emotionally charged issue with
high public interest. In the wake of events such as Linehan’s controversial release and the
tragedy of Sjodin’s death, the public demands immediate actions to ensure safety needs are met
and its representatives act with little heed to the cost (both monetary and societal).
Unfortunately, groups focused on sexual violence prevention receive less attention and as a result
less funding. This course of action results in a tunneling of our focus. According to Eric Janus,
as described in his book Failure to Protect, “We have restricted our focus to the downstream part
of the problem – those individuals who continue to offend even after they have gone to prison –
and have rendered less visible the upstream, but much larger, aspect of the problem.”62
Although seemingly academic, there is another manner in which to characterize the
problem that plagues the rationale behind sexual violence policy: the problem of induction. The
problem of induction was championed by 19th century British philosopher David Hume
59

$117,000 per resident in 2010; $122,000 per resident in 2011. Id. at 12.
Range in last four years: $75 million in 2008 to $67.5 million in 2011. Id. at 12.
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In 2006, Minnesota spent $130.5 million on sexual offenders and $90.5 million on victims of sexual violence.
Costs Report, supra note 2, at 7-10.
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(although he did not explicitly call it such) in response to his concerns about causal inferences.
Hume worried that over-reliance on past experience could lead one to believe that nature behaves
in a uniform manner despite our experience demonstrating otherwise. Put simply, the problem of
induction is creating a general rule from an isolated experience; the “problem” is unsound
reasoning because there is a lack of necessary causation. For example, in the context of this
paper’s discussion, the most recent sexual violent offender had traits x, y, and z; therefore, all
sexual violent offenders will embody such traits. Yet, this type of erroneous reasoning continues
to pervade sexual violence policy. Simple existential awareness of the beliefs and presumptions
that drive current sexual violence policy could improve future reasoning and promote sounder
approaches.
More contemporary work has been proliferated that further explicates the poor reasoning
underlying current sexual violence policy. In 2007, epistemologist Nassim Taleb63 advanced the
problem of induction through his “Black Swan Theory.” The idea stems from the following
fallacious example: It was once thought only white swans existed because only white swans had
ever been observed; when a black swan was observed it had a profound impact because it
undermined current “understanding.” Such is the course of a “black swan event.” Talib warns
against the black swan event because the less it is accounted for, the greater impact it will have.
At the same time, black swan events are not predictable, and they are not objective; they result
from overconfidence in knowledge and a failure to recognize epistemic limitations.64

The

gravity of a black swan event results from the event being outside “the usual” and the
(sometimes extreme) over-reliance on recurring but not necessary recurring events. However,
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Nassim Nicholas Taleb is a Lebanese-born epistemologist focused on the problems of luck, uncertainty, and
probability. He holds a professorship at the New York University’s Polytechnic Institute.
64
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE xxiii (paperback ed.
2010).
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their effect can be mitigated by checking what we think we “know” and by not attempting to
retrospectively justify the event as foreseeable (thus circumventing the notion that such an event
was ever outside our knowledge).
Perhaps most importantly, Taleb is not engaged in a purely academic exercise – he is
concerned with the effect epistemic arrogance has on our everyday lives. This is because when
pervasive false beliefs are unsettled, the consequences are magnified. The rationale underlying
sexual violence policy fits squarely within Taleb’s paradigm. High profile, widely reported
events like rape or murder lead people to believe such events are “the norm” instead of the rarity.
Furthermore, it is believed that the same small group of people is responsible for this “norm.”
This false norm coupled with the illusory belief that most sexual violence is committed by
strangers (i.e., stranger danger) results in polices that are highly reactionary to soothe the general
fear of the public. Yet, most individuals who commit sexually violent acts resulting in prison
sentences have no prior history of a violent offense, and sex offenders with a prior conviction for
a sexual offense comprise only 14% of those in prison for sexual violence.65 Furthermore, it is
estimated that in most sexual assaults the victim knows the perpetrator; approximately 15% of
those in prison for sexual assault claim their victim was a stranger to them.66 Finally, even
though these statistics demonstrate violent sexual offenses do not fit the common stereotype,
most sexual violence goes unreported and thus these statistics may be inflated.67 Ignorance of
common facts about sexual violence coupled with a failure to account for the sexual violence
that is unseen leads to a failure to make comprehensive sexual violence policy.
Data defying what is believed to be the “norm” demonstrate the legislature’s sexual
violence policies are a result of epistemological arrogance (i.e., believing that all sexual
65
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offenders fit the same traits). When a rare, high profile event (i.e., black swan event), such as the
Sjodin tragedy, occurs, the public and legislature consider such an event as an affirmation of
their “knowledge” (i.e., stranger danger, high recidivism) instead of an unpredictable aberration.
This type of reasoning creates an inconsistency whereby people are reacting abnormally to what
they perceive as normal. Meanwhile, the bulk of sexual violence never figures into the equation.
Instead of over-relying on the usual (e.g., intra-family sexual violence) and being shocked by the
rare event (e.g., the Sjodin tragedy), the rare event is relied upon as “the usual” and when this
“usual” occurs it has the shock effect of the rare (because it is in fact a rare event). This is
directly in line with Taleb’s warnings. The black swan event cannot be predicted, only hedged.
Our false perceptions (i.e., epistemic arrogance) amplify the reaction to the rare (black swan)
event. Instead of focusing on that which can be known, such is ignored in the quixotic quest to
prevent an event outside our epistemic range. To reify, by believing the infrequent, horrific
sexually violent act can be predicted (and thus prevented) the majority of sexual violence goes
unheeded and the focus of sexual violence policy continues in vain.
In the wake of rare, shocking sexual violence, the reasoning behind policy for the last two
decades has been that such assaults were “foreseeable” if only the “right factors” would have
been noticed.

This narrative fallacy68 has led to the procedural and substantive changes

occurring in the sex offender policy; legislatures believe the rare, unpredictable event is within
their power to prevent. As such, significant resources (via Department of Corrections referrals,
county attorney assessments, Minnesota Sex Offender Program) are devoted to detaining
previously convicted sex offenders and creating obstacles to rejoining society for released sex

68

Taleb uses the phrase “narrative fallacy” in a similar manner as post hoc rationalizations. The narrative fallacy is
our [humans] inability to look at a series of events without giving the events an explanation (i.e., narration). By
linking events together through perceived causes (real or imaginary), those events “make more sense” to us but also
give us a false sense of understanding [which exacerbates the black swan event].
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offenders. Consequently, little or no resources are allocated to programs that focus daily on
preventing common sexual violence (seen and unseen) because such efforts do not fit in the fight
against the (false) paradigm.
We will return to the significance of the black swan event and its relation to the sexual
violence policy response in this article’s conclusion.69
V.

Uniting Intervention and Prevention Responses
There is a growing understanding that the simple solutions offered by
legislative policies broadly applied to every offender have not been
effective in keeping children safe or preventing sexual abuse.
Furthermore, the isolation and stigmatizing effect of legislation on sex
offenders and their families have generated a number of unintended
consequences that limit family, community and societal ability to prevent
sexual abuse in the first place. Tough restrictive policies are applied
broadly and typically do not recognize the continuum of behaviors of
sexual abuse, the range of ages of those who sexually abuse, and the
range of risk posed by sex offenders to re-offend.70
MNCASA has advanced several legislative proposals in recent years with varying

degrees of success. The coalition’s annual policy agenda (developed with the assistance of a
multidisciplinary committee) typically has three sections addressing sexual violence prevention,
support and care for victims, and access to justice, recognizing that a well-rounded legislative
response takes into account primary, secondary and tertiary prevention approaches.
MNCASA’s legislative agenda is generally met with bi-partisan support so any barriers
to passage tend to come from fiscal impact (costs to the system such as prison beds) rather than
philosophical or political difference. For example, over the past four years MNCASA has
worked with supportive legislators on both sides of the aisle to propose two noncontroversial
bills: presumptive executed sentencing for repeat sex offenders and enhancement from a gross

69
70

See Section VI.
A Reasoned Approach, supra note 5, at 42.
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misdemeanor to a felony for repeat fifth degree criminal sexual conduct convictions.71 The
former addresses an omission when the sentencing guidelines were changed in 2006 and the
latter recognizes that some sex offenders engaged in nonconsensual sexual contact could
conceivably be convicted of the same crime over and over yet never reach a higher level of
accountability.72
These bills are primarily concerned with system intervention with a sex offender but
there are prevention aspects as well, namely identifying someone who has a propensity to reoffend. While it cannot be proven that an offender who repeatedly commits a low level criminal
sexual conduct crime in the fifth degree will “graduate” to more serious sex crimes, heightened
scrutiny will lead ideally to more system involvement with the offender and perhaps better
opportunities to prevent future crimes.
The costs associated with these two bill proposals are relatively low (each comes in under
$100,000 in the first year with comparative amounts in the subsequent years) and yet they cannot
seem to move at all through the legislature because of the associated costs related to more prison
resources. Meanwhile, costs incurred by the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, for example,
continue to rise at an alarming annual rate and the legislature continues to support these cuts,
although with the recognition that they are not sustainable.73 While fiscal caution is
understandable given the significant state budget cuts over the most recent years, a small
investment in early intervention and possible prevention seems like a reasonable price to pay. In
the absence of a cost-benefit analysis to support a sure connection between policy change, fiscal
investment and a successful system response, it still seems prudent to make small yet targeted
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During the 2011-12 biennium, HF660/SF 415 and HF532/SF794, respectively. See http://www.leg.state.mn.us
(last visited Oct. 7, 2012) for the bill texts.
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changes in the criminal sexual conduct laws that ensure ongoing system involvement with repeat
offenders and create the potential to prevent future crimes.74
A successful bill proposal from the 2012 legislative session requires the Minnesota
Department of Health to report on sexual violence incidence and prevalence data.75 Data
collected from various sources will help to inform policy proposals on sexual violence in the
future, promoting a more evidence-based approach. Data can be useful in evaluating both
prevention and intervention-oriented legislative responses to sexual violence.
One area of controversy in the public policy arena is around the issue of comprehensive
sexual health education. This concept that does not enjoy bipartisan support; there are political
and philosophical differences about who should teach youth about sexuality and sexual health
and what information should be shared with youth. In the past MNCASA has supported bills
(none passed) with its community partners in the Coalition for Responsible Sex Ed76 because a
better understanding of sexuality, particularly among young people, provides a gateway
opportunity for discussions about the prevention of sexual violence, coercive behaviors, what
consent really means and other related issues.77 Comprehensive sexual health education also
plays an important role in related public policy discussions such as how to respond to sexting or
bullying and sexual harassment, particularly amongst youth. 78 So even as lawmakers consider
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A cost-benefit analysis of legislative policy regarding criminal sexual conduct laws would be a welcome addition
to this discussion. A recent analysis of government-funded intervention in the lives of homeless and sexually
exploited girls, for example, showed a return of $34 for every $1 spent. Lauren Martin & Richard Lotspeich, Early
Intervention to Avoid Sex Trading and Trafficking of Minnesota’s Female Youth: A Benefit-Cost Analysis (2012),
http://www.miwrc.org/system/uploaded_files/0000/0147/Benefit-Cost-Study_Full_Report_9-4-2012.pdf (last visited
Oct. 7, 2012). For other discussions of cost-benefit analyses in the context of sex offender policy see Robert A.
Prentky and Ann Wolbert Burgess, Rehabilitation of Child Molesters: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, CHILD TRAUMA I:
ISSUES AND RESEARCH (1990) and Examining Our Approaches, supra note 1.
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intervention-style approaches to dealing with these sorts of problems, there should always be a
prevention message attached.
Finally, MNCASA’s legislative agenda is driven by guiding principles. With regard to
the system response to sex offenders, MNCASA continues to see civil commitment as one option
within a preferably wide-ranging system response, particularly for the most dangerous
perpetrators, but also recognizes the need for less restrictive alternatives to secure facility
commitments for some other offenders who present less of a risk to the public (including re-entry
programs for better opportunities for housing and employment) and always maintains that
continued meaningful financial support for victim services is essential.79
Various options such as indeterminate sentencing, specialized courts and sex offender
review boards charged with determining the terms of release should be considered and the
Department of Human Services Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force will look
at these and many other potential recommendations for the 2013 legislative session and beyond
in the months ahead (the Task Force will complete its work in December 2013).80 Many of these
issues were explored in great detail by the Governor’s Commission on Sex Offender Policy and
it is certain that the Task Force will also be looking to such areas as less restrictive alternatives to
secure facility commitments as well as sentencing practices, changes to the criminal sexual
conduct laws, funding and prevention.81

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Connection Between Bullying and Sexual Violence Perpetration,
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/bullying_sv.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
79
See A Reasoned Approach, supra note 5, at 2-4.
80
See minutes and resource materials from the Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force,
http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService=GET_DYNAMIC_CONVERSION&RevisionSelectionMethod
=LatestReleased&dDocName=dhs16_171337 (last visited Nov. 25, 2012). The Task Force composition is
multidisciplinary with members including representatives from judicial, legislative (bipartisan), law enforcement,
prosecutorial, defense, victim service, treatment and county administration perspectives.
81
Governor’s Commission, supra note 26. Among the report’s many recommendations are development of a
blended determinate-indeterminate sentencing system for sex offenders, creation of a Sex Offender Release Board,
increasing the statutory maximum indeterminate sentencing to life for offenders with prior histories of criminal
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In addition, MNCASA would like to see greater attention paid to increased access to sex
offender treatment, policies for adolescents and children with sexual behavior problems, more
cross-agency coordination of existing state intervention and prevention services to maximize the
policy impact on primary prevention, and state funding for primary prevention services.
Concurrently, support for sexual assault victim advocacy services must be maintained with
reasonable funding and more access to services in every county and reservation in Minnesota.
During the state government shutdown of 2011 the District Court and Special Master recognized
that sexual assault advocacy and crisis response programs are “critical core functions of
government” and are “crucial to the safety of Minnesota communities.”82
VI.

Conclusion
The problem of sexual violence is endemic, meaning its occurrence is steady (as opposed

to spiking, like during an epidemic). Its relatively unchanging nature also suggests a certain level
of acceptance by society that some portion of the population will be subjected to this type of
harm. This isn’t to say that society or policy makers are complacent about the problem, just the
response is misplaced at times and as a result we haven’t witnessed a dramatic positive change.
This lack of success can feel defeating and demoralizing. We are only seeing the black swans –
the aberrations that distract us – and failing to look more broadly to the expertise and experience
that will help policymakers work toward the solutions that can create a difference.83

sexual conduct, increased penalties for specific statutory sections, specialized sex offender caseloads under
supervision, special considerations for juvenile offenders, establishment of a Sex Offender Policy Board, evaluation
of sex offender registry information, creation of a specialized panel for civil commitments, creating structured
treatment options, review of collateral consequences attendant to a sex offense conviction, and many more. Id. at 16.
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According to Tabachnick and Klein, “When communities hold offenders accountable in
thoughtful ways that prevent re-offense, they increase the likelihood that others will get the help
they need before they perpetrate sexual abuse.”84 With each passing year we learn more about
the nature of sexual violence, about the people who commit the crimes, about the societal norms
that promote unhealthy sexual images, and what policies are most effective based upon evidencebased measures. The thoughtful response that Tabachnick and Klein put forth is one that
balances prevention and intervention strategies in a comprehensive approach, one that is more
pro-active than reactive, one that recognizes the specific needs of all involved (victims,
offenders, society as a whole). In other words, the thoughtful response is perhaps the most
difficult one of all, but as the problem of sexual violence persists and as public policy continues
to miss the mark, it is the response that must be made.
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